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Sovereign Immunity - An Argument Con
Steven A. Sindell*
U NDER THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGN OR GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY, a
state may not be sued in tort without its consent.1 This doctrine,
though the subject of repeated judicial challenges, is adhered to in a
significant number of jurisdictions.2 It is the contention of this article
that the rcason for the rule no longer exists and that it should, there-
fore, be abolished as a controlling legal principle. Moreover, it is
submitted that sovereign immunity violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the United States Constitution.3
Kent State and the Immunity Doctrine
Because sovereign immunity deprives individuals of the right to
bring suit in tort for redress against the state, the doctrine has been
the subject of severe criticism ever since its birth in the Feudal Era.4
There has been widespread criticism of the sovereign immunity doc-
trine among magistrates and scholars, and this criticism has recently
surfaced in Krause v. Ohio,' arising out of the killings and injuries
of students on the campus of Kent State University in a shooting
incident which occurred there in May, 1970.
*B.A., Columbia; J.D., University of California at Berkeley, Member of the California and
Ohio Bars. Lecturer, Cleveland State University College of Law; Counsel for plaintiff in
Krause v. Ohio.
149 AM. JIJR. States, Territories and Dependencies, § 91 (1943).
2 Sovereign immunity exists virtually intact in the following states:
Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
It has been partially or totally abrogated in the following states:
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Texat, Vermont and Washington.
3 U.S. CONSIT. amend. XIV, § 1.
4 yea, e.g., Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alas, 1962); Stone v. Arizona Highway
Comm'n., 93 Ariz. 3S4, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d
211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rprr. 89 (1961); Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs., 482
P.2d 968 (Colo. 1971); Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Smith v.
Idaho, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937 (1970); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist.,
18 II.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841, 457 P.2d 21
(1969); Haney v. Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ct. App. Ky. 1964); Williams v. Detroit,
364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn.
279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962); Johnson v. Municipal Univ. of Omaha, 184 Nub. 512,
169 N.W.2d 286 (1969); Rice v. Clark County, 79 Nev. 253, 382 P.2d 605 (1963),
Wilis v. Department of Conserv. & Econ. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970); Becker
v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 838, 261 A.2d 896 (1970); Bucholz v. Siouv Falls, 77 S.D. 322,
91 N.W.2d 606 (1958); Kelso v. Tacoma, 63 Wash.2d 913, 390 P.2d 2 (1964); Holytz
v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962); tee also, authorities cited in
notet 34 and 35, infra.
'Krause v. Ohio, 28 Ohio App.2d 1, 274 N.E.2d 321 (1971); rrv'd, 31 Ohio St.2d 132,
285 N.E.2d 736 (1972), appeal dimissed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3329 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1972) (No.
22), petition for rehearing dismissed, ........ U.S . .... , Jan. 22, 1973.
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Several of the students injured at Kent, and families of those
who were killed, sought to obtain redress by bringing suit against
the State of Ohio as sole defendant for personal injuries and/or
wrongful death. The pleading alleged that agents, servants, and em-
ployees of the State of Ohio were negligent and careless, and com-
mitted wanton and reckless misconduct, and prayed for damages in
tort accordingly. In Krause v. Ohio, the trial court dismissed the
State of Ohio as a party-defendant on the pleadings "for the reason
that it has not consented to be sued in the circumstances disclosed
by the complaint, and is immune from tort liability, by reason of its
sovereign immunity."' The effect of the trial court's decision was to
deny the injured parties a forum for redress.
The Krause litigation took a unique turn at the intermediate
appellate level. There, Presiding Judge Day, with one judge dis-
senting, delivered a four-part majority opinion reversing the trial
court.7 First, the court held that the State of Ohio is responsible
under the doctrine respondeat superior for the torious acts of its
agents.' Second, it held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was
unjust, arbitrary, and unreasonable, and that it was violative of the
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.9 Third, the court reasoned
that since sovereign immunity was a creature of judicial interpreta-
tion, it could as well be abrogated by the judiciary. 10 Finally, the
court held that individual agents of the state retained immunity from
civil liability while they were acting in an authorized capacity, but
that the state was subject to liability if the activity was tortious.)
The Court of Appeals addressed itself to the heart of the immunity
problem:
Governmental immunity is an anachronism. It repre-
sents a vestige of the agent apotheosis of the state in the
person of a king. That the king can do no wrong is a dubious
concept in a nation whose very founding repudiated kings.
Discussions of such immunity begin with the idea of pro-
tecting acts of the state (something greater than the sum of
its citizens) and finish by shielding the wrongful acts of
6Journal Entry, Krause v. Ohio, Civil No. 884,042 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio, C.P., Nov.
17, 1970).
728 Ohio App.2d 1, 274 N.E.2 321 (1971),rev'd, 31 Ohio St.2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736
(1972), appeal dijnissed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3329 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1972) (No. 22), petition
for rehearing dismissed -- U.S - , Jan. 22, 1973.
8id. at 1, 274 N.E.2d at 322.
9Id.
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men. A person claiming injury is unprotected in either case.
If, in fact, a culpable inj ury has been done and goes un-
chastised by the law because of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, that doctrine protects injustice for no better
reason than that its source is the state. And the concept be-
comes this: "The king can do no wrong with impunity." This
is outlaw doctrine, obviously incompatible with the rule of
law. Moreover, the notion that the government may irre-
sponsibly maim or kill contravenes the most elemental notions
of due process of law.
The State of Ohio filed an appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court.
In a 6-1 opinion, Justice Lloyd Brown dissenting, the Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reasserted and
reaffirmed the long line of Ohio decisions which supports the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity.
Justice Corrigan, in his concerning opinion in the Supreme
Court, correctly characterized the decision as one that "forges no
new principle of law, but adheres to one consistently applied by this
court in the past." 3 Thereafter, Arthur Krause brought an appeal
to the Supreme Court of the United States, but the appeal was dis-
missed for want of a substantial federal question. A subsequent peti-
tion for rehearing was similarly dismissed. 4
Sovereign Immunity: Long Live the King!
Governmental tort immunity was born in pre-sixteenth-century
England, and was premised on the feudal notion that "The King can
do no wrong." This latter concept was predicated on the rule in
the feudal structure that the lord of the manor, or the king, was not
subject to suit in his own courts. 5 Thus, in the first English case on
the subject, Russell v. Men of Devon,6 the court dismissed an action
against all male inhabitants of the County of Devon on the basis
that "it is better that an individual sustain an injury than that the
"917public should suffer an inconvenience ....
The rationale of Men of Devon was adopted in America in an
1812 Massachusetts case, Mower v. Leichester.8 In that case, Mower's
121d. at 5-6, 274 N.E.2d at 324-25.
1331 Ohio St.2d 132, 148, 285 N.E.2d 736, 746 (1972), appeal dismissed, 41 U.S.L.W.
3329 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1972) (No. 22), petition for rehearing dismissed, ........... US,
- .---- -- Jan. 22, 1973.
1"41 U.S.L.W. 3329 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1972) (No. 22), petition for rehearing dismissed,
---........-U.S -........... Jan  22, 1973.
"See generally 1 F. POLLOCK AND F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY or ENGLISH LAW 518
(2d ed. 1898).
16100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
'1d. at 362.
1o Mower v. Leichester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812).
19731
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horse was killed when it stepped into a hole on the Leichester Bridge.
The court held that Leichester, on the authority of Men of Devon,
being a quasi-corporation, would not be liable. Curiously, unlike the
County of Devon, Leichester was incorporated, could sue and be
sued, and had a corporate fund out of which the judgment could be
satisfied. Notwithstanding these differences, the Massachusetts court
followed the early English case and thereby created what is today a
prevailing American rule.
The Case Against Immunity: Justification or Excuse?
Proponents of sovereign immunity contend that, though the
doctrine may have been premised on an illogical and outdated con-
cept, there are new legal and economic reasons for its perpetuation.
These purported justifications have been summarized by the late Dean
Prosser:
The immunity is said to rest upon public policy; the ab-
surdity of a wrong committed by an entire people; the idea
that whatever the state does must be lawful, which has re-
placed the king who can do no wrong; the very dubious
theory that an agent of the state is always outside the scope
of his authority and employment when he commits any
wrongful act; reluctance to divert public funds to compen-
sate for private injuries; and the inconvenience and em-
barrassment which would descend upon the government if
it should be subject to such liability. 9
The economic justification noted above by Dean Prosser as "the
reluctance to divert public funds," has been frequently advanced by
proponents of governmental immunity.0 Accordingly, the State in
Krause v. Ohio contended:
Thus, sovereign immunity stands in intimate relation to
the ability of state government to meet its responsibilities.
It protects vital state safety and social services, already
woefully underfinanced; it enables the state to pursue long
term social planning, without fear of an unexpected drain
upon state monies; it relieves the state of government by
timidity, whereby high risk but vital projects are rejected
because of the threat of continuous and financially enervating
litigation; and, finally, sovereign immunity spares the state
a debilitating "tax" on its inescapable function as protector
against civil violence.
19W. PROSSPR, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 1001 (31d ed. 1964).
20The reason, however, was never mentioned by the Ohio Supreme Court in Kraose.
21 Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 33, Krause v. Ohio, 31 Ohio St.2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736
(1972), appeal dismissed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3329 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1972) (No. 22), petition
for rehearing dismissed, --....... U.S . . Jan. 22, 1973.
[Vol. 22:55
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The "economic justification" tends to support the rationale that
the abolition of sovereign immunity and the state's consent to be
sued is a matter peculiarly within the legislative prerogative.
It is submitted that this kind of reasoning, adopted by the pro-
ponents of governmental immunity, is unjustified. It has been per-
suasively argued that fear of economic consequences, judicial defer-
ence to the legislatures, and adherence to stare decisis, are more
excuses for the continuing existence of this anachronistic doctrine,
than justifications for its perpetuation. 22
The California State Legislature has made a study" of the
economic consequences of the abolition of sovereign immunity which
should allay fears of economic catastrophe. This report," published
by the California State Senate, outlined that in the State of New
York between the years 1959 and 1962, the Court of Claims of New
York disposed of cases with prayers totaling $23,835,958, but that
it actually paid, pursuant to judgment or settlement, only $1,125,160,
or 4.7% of the actual prayers."
Furthermore, the study indicates that any tort claims can ade-
quately be buffere'd by means of insurance. In California, for example,
after the Muskopf decision (which abolished sovereign immunity)
but before the California Tort Claims Act became effective, insur-
ance costs averaged between .099% to 1.269% of the annual budgets
of cities, school districts and counties. In 1962, the average per capita
cost for cities was only 41 cents; for school districts only 65 cents;
and for counties, only 8 cents.26 It would appear that the cost of
abolition of sovereign immunity would be relatively small. Along
these lines, Dean Green, commenting on the "economics theory," has
noted the following:
Private concerns have rarely been greatly embarrassed,
and in no instance, even where immunity is not recognized,
has a municipality been seriously handicapped by tort
liability. This argument is like so many of the horribles
paraded in the early tort cases when courts were fashioning
the boundaries of tort law. It has been thrown in simply
because there was nothing better at hand. The public's will-
22 See, e.g., cases cited note 4, supra.
n Cited by Justice Lloyd Brown, dissenting in Krause v. Ohio, 31 Ohio St.2d at 156, 285
N.E.2d at 750.
24 See CALIFORNIA SENATE FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, SEVENTH PROGRESS
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, (PART 1) (1961-63 GOVERNMENTAL TORT ItABILITY),
available from the author or from the California State Senate, Capitol Bldg., 10th at L. & N.,
Sacramento, California 95814.
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ingness to stand up and pay the costs of its enterprises car-
ried out through municipal corporations is no less than its
insistence that individuals and groups pay the costs of their
enterprises. Tort liability is in fact a very small item in
the budget of any well organized enterprise. 27
Even in the absence of a -alid economic argument, many state
jurisdictions continue to cover themselves with the immunity cloak.
For the most part, immunity proponents have asserted that the courts
are bound by stare decisis, and that any change from the status quo
should be made legislatively, and not judicially. If ever any force of
reason supported the existence of governmental immunity, such
reason has clearly dissipated. In the 1961 California Supreme Court
case, Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District,28 Chief Justice Traynor
thoroughly repudiated the outmoded logic of Men of Devon:
If the reasons for Russell v. Men of Devon and the rule
of county or local district immunity ever had any substance
they have none today. PUBLIC CONVENIENCE DOES NOT
OUTWEIGH INDIVIDUAL COMPENSATION ....
The rule of government immunity for tort is an anach-
ronism, without rational basis, and has existed only by the
force of inertia. It has been judicially abolished in other
jurisdictions,
None of the reasons for its continuance can withstand
analysis. No one defends total governmental immunity. In
fact, it does not exist. It has become riddled with exceptions,
both legislative . . . and judicial, . . . and the exceptions
operate so illogically as to cause serious inequality. (Em-
phasis added) (Citations omitted)"
The decision in Muskopf, which was the first judicial decision
completely abrogating sovereign immunity, reflects an ever-increas-
ing dissatisfaction with the sovereign immunity rule. Indeed, since
Muskopf, there has been a resounding judicial vocalization of dis-
content with the immunity doctrine. For instance, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin in 1962 said:
7 Green, Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 ILL. L. REv. 355, 379 (1944).
2 55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).




There are probably few tenets of American jurispru-
dence which have been so unanimously berated as the gov-
ernmental immunity doctrine. This Court, and the highest
Courts of numerous States, have been unusually articulate
in castigating the existing rule; text writers and law review
writers joined in the chorus of denunciators.G
The fact of the matter is that there are a number of judicial
abrogations of sovereign immunity throughout the nation. Four state
supreme courts, for example, have abolished the doctrine of sovereign
immunity outright.31 Numerous other state supreme courts have vir-
tually abolished the doctrine by partial abrogation, which effectively
removes the philosophical and legal underpinnings of the doctrine.
32
In addition, a number of state legislatures have rejected the doctrine
of sovereign immunity in various legislative enactments.? Moreover,
legal literature is surfeited with persistent and incisive protests
against the doctrine, by writers and scholars.3
These expressions of dissatisfaction with the sovereign immunity
rule reflect the growing recognition of the injustice and irrationality
inherent in this arguably discriminatory legal concept which denies
innocently injured victims of state negligence, redress in the court.
Many jurists of this country feel that the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity should, in fact, be abrogated. Though some attempts have
been made to justify the doctrine, there is a dearth of material at-
30Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 33, 115 N.W.2d 618, 621 (1962).
31Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Muskopf v.
Coning Hosp. Dist., 55 CaL2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, It Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Evans v,
Board of County Comr'rs, 482 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1971); Willis v. Department of Conserv.
& Econ. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970).
2See cases cited note 4 spra (Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington and Wisconsin).
"See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2671-74 (1965); ILL. ANN. STAT., Ch. 37, § 439.8(b)
(1972); IND. ANN. STAT., , 4-1501 (1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS, Ch. 258, . 1 (1968);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN., § 600.6419 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN.. 3 3.751 (19.67);
MONT- REV. CODES ANN.. S 83-601 (1966); NER. REV. STAT.. § 24-319-3i5 (1965);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN., § 491.8 (1968); N.Y. CT. CL. AcT. § 9 (McKinney 1963),
N.C GEN. STAT. $ 143-291 (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 32-12-02 (1960)" ORE. REV.
STAT., § 30.320 (1971); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN., § 33-6-4 (1967); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN., 3 4.92.010 (1962).
34See Borchard, Government Liability In Tort, 34 YALE 1.J. 1 (1924); Davis, Sovereign
Imnsunitn Must Go, 22 AD. L. REv. 383 (1970); Davis, Tort Liability of Governrmental
Units, 40 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1956); Green, Municipal Liabiliy for Torts, 38 ILL. L.
REV. 355 (1944); Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations, 4 ILL. L.Q. 28
(1921); Kantrowitz and Leflar, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L REV. 1363
(1954); Kramer, Government Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United States, 1790-1955,
1966 ILL. L. FoRUM 795 (1966); Mifka, Sovereign Immunity, 1966 ILL. L. FORUM 828
(1966); Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislature in the Reform of Tort law, 48
MINN. L. REv. 265 (1966); Pugh, Historical Approach to tke Doctrine of Sovereign Im-
munhy, 13 LA. L. REV. 476 (1953); Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrine
of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAW & CONTEMP, PROB. 214 (1942); Rosenfield, Govern-
(Continued on next page)
1973]
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1973
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
tempting to support it as logical or rational." Some examples of
judicial criticism of the sovereign immunity doctrine are illuminat-
ing. The Supreme Court of Colorado, in Evans v. Board of County
Commissioners,36 directed its attention to the illogic of the immunity
doctrine:
It is possible that sovereign immunity as we know it
stemmed in large part from its transformation in the Eng-
lish kingship, including augmented powers and divine and
transcendental characteristics, which was occasioned by the
Tudor monarchs, particularly Henry VIII, in pursuit of such
ends as the split of the Church of England from the Church
of Rome and the unity of temporal and spiritual life in
England. The monarchial philosophies invented to solve the
marital problems of Henry VIII are not su.ficient justifica-
tion for the denial of the right of recovery against the
government in today's society. Assuming there was sovereign
immunity of the Kings of England, our forebears won the
Revolutionary War to rid themselves of such sovereign im-
munity prerogatives. (Emphasis supplied)37
In the same case, the court examined the evolution of the rule
and announced that the doctrine in Colorado was the result of two
cases. Upon review of those two cases, the court determined that
the rule of law promulgated by them, and perpetuated by some forty-
odd cases since, was wrong ab initio. The court remarked:
We think that [these cases], the two cornerstones of
sovereign and governmental immunity in Colorado, were
wrong when announced and they are wrong today; repeti-
tion of them forty times or four hundred times doesn't make
good law or cause the reasons for the doctrine to become
any stronger. In any event, if the doctrines were not wrong
when some or all of these decisions were written, they are
now. (Emphasis added) 31
(Continued from preceding page)
mental Immunity from Liability for Tort in School Accidents, 5 LEGAL NOTES ON LOCAL
GOVERNMENT 380 (1940); Shumate, Tort Claims Against State Government, 9 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 242 (1942); Van Alstyne, Govern mental Tort Liability: A Public Policy
Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A. 1. REV. 463 (1963); Editorial Note, Claims Against the State ol
Ohio: The Need for Reform, 36 CIN. L. REV. 239 (1967); Note, Limitations on the Doc-
trine of Sovereign Immunity from Suit, 41 CoL. L. REV. 1236 (1941); Note, Approaches
to Governmental Immunity foe Tort. 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 182 (1942); Note, The
Sovereign Immunity of the States. The Doctrine and Some of itr Recent Developments, 40
MINN. L. REV. 234 (1955); Comment, Ohio Sovereign Immunity- Long Lives the King,
28 OHIO ST. L.J. 75 (1967); Governmental Immunity from Tort Liability: Has the
Rationale Disappeared?, 39 UNIv. MO, KAN. CITY L. REv. 252 (1971); State Immunity
Irom Suit Withoat Consent: Scope and Implications, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 879 (1971).
S Nowhere, for example, in the Ohio Supreme Court decision in Kraose, doe the court
squarely support the doctrine on its merits.
14482 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1971).
1 Id. at 969.
38 d. at 972.
[Vol. 22 :55
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Unlike the California Supreme Court in Musicopf, many courts
which retain immunity from tort liability place great weight on
stare decisis. Thus, in Conway v. Humbert,9 the South Dakota
Supreme Court said:
If governmental immunity . . . was founded upon an
erroneous basis ... it is not now of controlling considera-
tion. The doctrine has become firmly imbedded in the com-
mon laws of this State and in reliance thereon the legislature
has enacted and amended statutes. (Emphasis added) 40
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Maryland held, in Weisner v,.
Board of Education:41
In our view the rule of [governmental immunity] is too
firmly established and has been too long unchanged by the
Legislature in the face of repeated reminders of its role in
the matter of opinions of the Courts and the Attorney Gen-
eral to be changed judicially, assuming that it should be
changed at all. If there is to be a change, we think the legis-
lature should make it.42
The same type of rationale was espoused by the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma: "Clearly our Legislature has in no way intended to
change the rule of this law which has been extant in this State for
all these years." (Emphasis added) 43
Similarly, the Supreme Courts of Maine 44 and New Mexico,
45
have utilized the same thought process. However, this line of reason-
ing hardly serves to support perpetuation of the sovereign immunity
doctrine on its authority alone, without some rational, positive force
other than mere inertia.
Some courts have demonstrated a willingness to look beyond the
weight of ancient precedent in fashioning a more flexible concept of
stare decisis. For example, on the issue of immunity, the Supreme
Court of Illinois said:
We have repeatedly held that the doctrine of stare
decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this Court to
blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and
3982 S.D. 317, 145 N.W.2d 524 (1966).
40 Id. at 324, 145 N.W.2d at 528-29.
41237 Md. 391, 206 A.2d 560 (1965).
411d. at 395, 206 A.2d at 562.
4 Chicago R. 1. & Pacific R.R. v Board of County Comm'rs, 389 P.2d 476, 478 (Okla. 1964).
"Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Auth'y., 157 Me. 174, 170 A.2d 687 (1961).
4SClark v. Ruidoso-Hondo Valley Hosp., 72 N.M. 9, 380 P.2d 168 (1963).
1973]
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that when it appears that public policy and social needs
require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as
a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and estab-
lish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right
and justice.46
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Arizona manifested an inclina-
tion toward change in its leading decision in Stone v. Arizona High-
way Commission :
We are of the opinion that when the reason for a certain
rule no longer exists, the rule itself should be abandoned.
After a thorough re-examination of the rule of governmental
immunity from tort liability, we now hold that it must be
discarded as a rule of law in Arizona and all prior decisions
to the contrary are hereby overruled. (Emphasis added)18
As part of a thorough analysis of the doctrine, the court pointed
out that it was "remarkable" that sovereign immunity existed this
long:
Professor Borchard has termed this phenomenon as
"one of the mysteries of legal evolution." Its survival for
such a great period of time in this country, where the royal
prerogative is unknown, has perhaps been even more remark-
able, considering it has been universally criticized as an
anachronism without rational basis. Most writers and cases
considering this fact have claimed that its only basis of
survival has been on grounds of antiquity and inertia.
(Citation omitted)49
Finally, after exhaustively repudiating the doctrine, the Su-
preme Court of Arizona addressed itself to the abrogation issue.
Justice Lockwood cast the death blow to governmental immunity in
that state:
Upon reconsideration we realize that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity was originally judicially created. We
are now convinced that a court-made rule, when unjust or
outmoded, does not necessarily become with age invulner-
able to judicial attack. This doctrine having been engrafted
upon Arizona law by judicial enunciation may properly be
changed or abrogated by the same process."
4 Molitor v. Kaneland Comin'y Unit Dist., 18 111.2d 11, 26, 163 N.E.2d 89,96 (1959).
4193 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963.
MId. at 387, 381 P.2d at 109.
V Id. at 388, 381 P.2d at 109.
501d. at 393. 381 P.2d at 113.
[Vol. 22:55
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It has elsewhere been judicially argued that the abrogation of
the immunity doctrine is a legislative and not a judicial function.
Several supreme courts have forthrightly rejected this contention.
The Supreme Court of Washington, for example, has said: "We
closed our courtroom doors without legislative help and we can like-
wise open them."5'
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed itself to
the problem and, in answer, enunciated: "It is time for the judiciary
to accept a like responsibility and adjudicate the tort liability of the
State itself."52
The Federal Question
Perhaps the most novel and vital consideration before the Ohio
Supreme Court in Krause was the constitutionality of the sovereign
immunity doctrine. The Court of Appeals, it will be recalled, held that
the immunity rule in Ohio was discriminatory and unjust, and viola-
tive of the United States Constitution.
Chief Judge Day, writing the Ohio Court of Appeals opinion,
elucidated a meaningful analysis of the important principle of equal
protection of the laws, as applied to Krause:
If the threat of multiple suits is not a tenable basis for
the distinctions created by the immunity, and we hold it is
not, then there is none. The distinctions then depend upon
a gossamer as frail as that supporting those distinctions
founded on nationality or race. A distinction so based is
capricious and represents no policy but an arbitrary attempt
to lift state responsibility without reason. In such circum-
stances the permissible [me between reasonable. classifica-
tion or a rational policy, and a denial of equal protection is
crossed. This fatally offends the Constitution. (Emphasis
added) 13
In response, Chief Justice O'Neill wrote for the Ohio Supreme
Court majority that:
Section 16 of Article I is not, on its face, discriminatory,
for it creates no classification. Without enabling legislation
it is an absolute bar to suits against the state. Nor is the
withholding of a legal remedy from persons injured by the
"1See Pierce v. Yakima Valley Mem. Hosp. Ass'n., 213 Wash.2d 162, 260 P.2d 765, 774
(1953), involving charitable immunity. The principle that a court may abrogate immunities,
however, is the same.
52 Willis v. Department of Conserv. & Econ. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 540, 264 A.2d 34, 37 (1970).
5328 Ohio App.2d 1, 11, 274 N.E.2d 321, 327 (1971), rev'd 31 Ohio St.2d 132, 285
N.E.2d 736 (1972), appeal dismissed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3329 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1972) (No. 22),
petition for rehearing dirtnisred, 1-.- . _ , Jan. 22, 1973.
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state, while allowing a remedy for nongovernmental tortious
activity, discriminatory governmental action. "The Consti-
tution does not require things which are different in fact
or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the
same." Tigner v. Texas (1940), 310 U.S. 141, 147. "* * *
the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to states the
power to treat different classes of persons in different ways."
Reed v. Reed (1971 - ----------- U.S. , ... .... ,30 L. Ed.
2d 225, 229 [sic].
Assuming arguendo, that there is in fact a classifica-
tion, it is one which the General Assembly is empowered to
make. To say that the state of Ohio is not entitled to a
defense, i.e., the right to plead lack of consent to such suit
merely because a nongovernmental tortfeasor does not have
the same right, is to preclude the combined legislative judg-
ment that there may be substantive differences between the
two types of conduct. " * * we must be mindful not of
abstract equivalents of conduct, but of conduct in the con-
text of actuality. Differences that permit substantive differ-
entiations also permit differentiations of remedy." Tigner v.
Texas, supra (310 U.S. 141), page 149. Equal protection
does not require that all inconsistencies be eradicated.
Moreover, the appellate court's observation that some
injured plaintiffs may recover damages if the governmental
activity is "excepted activity" is not a valid premise for a
finding of a denial of Equal Protection of the Laws. Assum-
ing that such observation refers to municipalities, or other
political subdivisions, there are sufficient substantive differ-
ences between them and the state to allow for such different
results, Whether it is the nature of the conduct or activity
undertaken, or the differences in its governmental and cor-
porate existence, we need not now explore. Those substantive
differences permit of different remedies and defenses. (See
County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court [1965]. 44 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 402 P. 2d 868.)
For the above-stated reasons, this court holds that the
doctrine of governmental immunity is not violative of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(Footnotes omitted) 54
'31 Ohio St.2d 132, 145, 285 NE.2d 736, 744 (1972), appeal dismissed, 41 U.S.L.W.
3329 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1972) (No. 22), petition for rehearing dismissed ....... U.S.
------------. Jan. 22, 1973.
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Justice Lloyd Brown joined the issue when he wrote in dissent:
Lack of equal protection of the laws can arise from the
denial to one segment of society the rights to due process of
law required by Fourteenth Amendment which are enjoyed
by the rest. Discrimination against such a legally "disen-
franchised" group (the victims of state negligence), in der-
ogation of as important a right as due process of law by
impeding open and equal access to the courts, is, in the
absence of a showing of compelling justification, "invidious
discrimination" which violates the equal protection clause.5
Given the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation that this pro-
vision is "an absolute bar to suits against the state" in the absence
of enabling legislation, then it would seem that the constitutional
provision does create two distinct classes of persons: namely, those
who are injured by private negligence who may bring suit for re-
covery, and those who are injured by governmental negligence who
may not bring suit for recovery. At the very least, the effect of such
an interpretation is the necessary creation of these two distinct
classes of persons. As noted, the Chief Justice ultimately did assume,
"arguendo," that there was such a classification, and justified it
essentially on the basis that "Equal protection does not require that
all inconsistencies be eradicated." 56 To say that equal protection does
not require the eradication of all inconsistencies does not elucidate
why equal protection does not require the eradication of this par-
ticular inconsistency, namely, the inconsistency created by the opera-
tion of the judicially-created doctrine of sovereign immunity. It would
appear that the Ohio Supreme Court majority never did specifically
explain why this particular classification is reasonable, or more
critically, specifically why or how it can withstand the test of federal
constitutionality.
Justice Brown countered the initial proposition of Chief Justice
O'Neill as follows:
The majority of this Court has asserted that "Section
16, Article I, is not, on its face, discriminatory, for it creates
no classification," because all persons are barred from their
bringing suits against the state. However, as recognized
in Brown v. Board of Edn. (1954), 347 U.S. 483 . ..
"separate but equal" does not comport with equal protection
of the laws where a fundamental right is involved.5
SSd. at 150, 285 N.E.2d at 747.
56Id. at 146, 285 N.E.2d at 745.
5
7 Id. at 152, 285 N.E.2d at 748.
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It appears that Justice Lloyd Brown's opinion comports with
the trend of equal protection decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, a trend which has continued unabated,5 8 notwithstanding the
recent changes in the membership of that Court. (It should be
noted that the question of whether sovereign immunity violates the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has never been
squarely determined, on the merits, by the United States Supreme
Court.) 9
An early United States Supreme Court decision, Yick Wo v.
Hopkins," clearly set forth the basic operative standard of equal
protection relied upon by the Ohio Court of Appeals:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial
in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so
as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations,
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the pro-
hibition of the Constitution. 1
Since that time, the concept of equal protection as it inheres in
the fourteenth amendment has been elucidated in a long line of
analogous decisions," The essential thrust of the current teachings
of these United States Supreme Court decisions would appear to
be that where a law, either by its terms, or in its operation, arbi-
trarily, capriciously, or invidiously discriminates against a class of
citizens, the law must fail as violative of the fourteenth amendment.
The critical determination depends upon what is an "arbitrary,
capricious, or invidious" discrimination, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,1° a
law which effectively operated so as to deprive Chinese of the right
to engage in business was held to violate equal protection guarantees.
In Baker v. Carr,6 3 a system which deprived citizens of an equal
see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1965); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n., 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942).
59 The Ohio immunity in Article 1, § 16 of the Ohio Constitution has withstood a challenge
as against Due Process of Law in Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U.S. 32 (1918); see Krause v. Ohio,
31 Ohio St.2d 132, n. 12 at 146, 285 N.E.2d 736, n. 12 at 745 (1972); appeal dis-
missed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3329 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1972) (No. 22), Petition for rehearing dis-
missed, ........-- U.S.. . Jan. 22, 1973.
Go Iis U.S. 356 (1886).
"Id. at 373-74, as cited in Krause v. Ohio, 28 Ohio App.2d 1, 10, 274 N.E.2d 321, 327
(1971), rev'd 31 Ohio St.2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972), appeal dismissed, 41 U.S.L.W.
3329 (U.S. Dec, 12, 1972) (No. 22), petition for rehearing dismissed, U.S.
---..------- Jan 22, 1973.
"See note 60 supra.
"a 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
63369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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power of the vote violated equal protection. In Takahashi v. Fish and
Game Commission," a law which forbade aliens to fish in California
waters, while allowing non-aliens to do so, violated equal protection
of the law. In Douglas v. California5 and Griffin v. Illinois," laws
which gave an unfair advantage to the wealthy criminal defendant,
and which the impoverished criminal defendant was denied in the
assertion of appellate rights, were held to violate equal protection
requirements. In Shapiro v. Thompson,6 7 a law which required a
one year state residency as a qualification for receiving state wel-
fare benefits violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In Skinner v. Oklahoma," a law which permitted ster-
ilization as a punishment for convicted larcenists, but not for con-
victed embezzlers, was held to have violated the equal protection
clause. As recently as 1971, the United States Supreme Court held
in Reed v. Reed,69 that a legal scheme which deprived women of the
same right as men with respect to a state probate system violated
equal protection of the law. In Brown v. Board of Education,/' the
United States Supreme Court struck down a legal framework which
operated to exclude Negroes from admission to public education,
thereby treating these citizens differently from Caucasians.
The decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals was the first in the
United States, let alone in Ohio, to examine sovereign immunity in
light of the recent constitutional requirements of equal protection
of the laws. The same may be said for the dissenting opinion of
Justice Lloyd Brown. In this sense, a new vista of legal thought in
this state came to encompass sovereign immunity. No prior decision
of the Ohio Supreme Court had discussed sovereign immunity from
the perspective of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause. In the absence of any controlling precedent in this regard,
the Court of Appeals was not only free, but was obligated, to make
its own determination of this important federal question. There
were precedents which were helpful, to some extent. Other State
Supreme Courts, such as those of California7' and Arizona 72 , had
judicially abrogated sovereign immunity on grounds of public policy.
-4334 U.S. 410 (1948).
65372 U.S. 353 (1963).
6351 U.S. 12 (1965).
- 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
68316 U.S. 535 (1942).
69404 U.S. 71 (1971).
70347 U.S. 483 (1954).
71 Muskopi v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
72 Stone v. Arizona Highway Comrn'n., 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963).
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Recently, the Colorado" and New Jersey" Supreme Courts have
similarly ruled. In Ohio, decisions such as Fleischman v. Flowers"
and Clouston v. Remlinger7' also seemed to signal an increased at-
tention and sensitivity by the Ohio Supreme Court to equal protec-
tion considerations. Indeed, in a concurring opinion in Hack v.
Salem77 in which Chief Justice O'Neill then joined, there was a clear
indication of dissatisfaction not only with the governmental-pro-
prietary distinction, but also with the sovereign immunity concept
itself, as applied to municipalities. In a case which was decided at
the same time as Krause v. State, namely, Sears v. Cincinnati," the
Ohio Supreme Court overruled its prior decision in Hyde v. Lake-
wood,79 by holding that the defense of governmental immunity is
not available to the municipality which owns and operates a hospital,
when the hospital commits negligence. A reading of Sears indicates
that the Ohio Supreme Court is still operating in the context of the
distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions,
the former giving rise to sovereign immunity, and the latter allow-
ing suit in the event of tortious conduct. This would seem to be a
paradoxical departure from the concurring opinion in Hack v. Salem
wherein Justice Gibson (with Chief Justice O'Neill joining) wrote
as follows:
The Courts have created the theory of liability and the
confusing classifications of municipal functions should be
willing to abolish the distinctions which so completely ignore
the fundamental issue involved as to which party is better
able to bear the cost. (Emphasis added)"
No such discussion in the majority opinion in Krause of "con-
fusing classifications" can be found, nor any such sensitivity to the
"fundamental issue . . . as to which party is better able to bear the
cost."
It therefore seems that the status of the law in Ohio will remain
substantially as it has been, and as the concurring opinion in Hack
characterized it in 1963: a series of "confusing classifications." It
would further seem that the continued perpetuation of the "govern-
73Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs., 482 P.2d 968 (Col. 1963).
74Willis v. Department of Conserv. & Econ. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970).
7525 Ohio St.2d 131, 267 N.E.2d 318 (1971).
622 Ohio St.2d 65, 258 N.E.2d 230 (1970).
7174 Ohio St. 383, 189 N.E.2d 857 (1963).
"131 Ohio St.2d 157, 285 N.E.2d 732 (1972).
"2 Ohio St.2d 155, 207 N.E.2d 547 (1965), overruled in Scars v. Cincianati, 31 Ohio St.2d
157, 285 N.E.2d 732 (1972).
80174 Ohio St. 383, 397, 189 N.E.2d at 868.
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mental-proprietary" distinction can only involve further difficulties
and confusion, which compounds what many magistrates and writers
have considered to be the essential injustice: the operation of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, itself.
Hopefully, the ultimate solution to this sensitive question in-
volving the basic right of access to the courts on the part of citizens
will ultimately have to be found either in the Federal Constitution,
or in legislative action.
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